

NOV - 2-1962

Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00428A000200050025-4

INTELLIGENCE GAP? "Cuba" raises doubts—and not just among GOP politicians.

High officials insist information-gathering has been reasonably successful. They argue air reconnaissance just couldn't confirm first hints of the missile buildup weeks ago; officials doubted Cuban exiles' reports. But Congress may probe possible failings in evaluating, communicating information. Complaints grow about consolidation of intelligence work.

McNamara's unification of Pentagon intelligence cuts the separate services' activity. CIA chief McCone pushes a consolidation government-wide. Military and civilian critics talk of dangers. Top policymakers, lacking divergent reports, may get no full tipoff to coming events, top intelligence men, more entwined in policymaking, may become biased in evaluating incoming information.

One gap plainly revealed: Until now, the U.S. did not know Russia had 1,000-mile mobile missiles, discovered in Cuba by air surveillance.

DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD

Gen. Carroll Saw Something

By RELMAN MORIN
Associated Press Staff Writer

Shortly after 7 o'clock on the night of Monday, October 15, a general of intelligence picked up the "hot line," a security telephone in the Pentagon, and put through an urgent call.

He said he had "seen something." His voice was taut.

This call, although nobody realized it then, was to un-

First of a Series

leash a swift and fearful train of events and raise the specter of nuclear war. The climax would come in another telephone call to President Kennedy, early last Sunday.

In between were the days that shook the world.

It was Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who made that telephone call October 15. He told Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric he had seen something disquieting in a new set of photographs of Cuba.

A reconnaissance mission had flown over the island on the previous day, Sunday.

Analyzing the pictures, experts detected some scars in the earth, along with evidence of construction work.

Minutes after Gen. Carroll's



LT. GEN. JOSEPH CARROLL

AP Wirephoto

report, a military staff car raced down the curving ramp of the Pentagon and headed across Washington to Mr. Gilpatric's home. It carried two experts in photo analysis.

They did not take the pictures with them. But they described the scars and other details of the Cuban terrain, not previously seen.

"Work on them some more and be ready to brief the boss," Defense Secretary McNamara

and the rest of us at 7:30 in the morning." Mr. Gilpatric told them:

The experts worked all night. Mr. Gilpatric went to a dinner at the home of Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By coincidence, Gen. Taylor's guests included most of the men who later participated in the decision-making conferences leading to the "quarantine" of Cuba—members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council and authorities from the Defense and State Departments.

Mr. Gilpatric told them about the photographs.

At 7:30 Tuesday morning, these same men met at the Pentagon with Mr. McNamara. The photo analysts reported their findings. The evidence of the construction of actual Soviet missile-launching sites still was not regarded as conclusive.

Mr. McNamara did consider it sufficiently "hard" and disquieting to call the White House. About an hour later, around 9 a.m., the information was in the President's hands.

Later that day, Mr. Kennedy examined the photographs himself.

His first step was to order a

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redoubling of reconnaissance over the suspicious points in Cuba.

Swift Changes Found

In the next few days pilots shot more than 32,000 feet of film over the suspicious sites. They recorded swift and baleful changes.

The evidence became incontrovertible. Soviet missile bases were rapidly rising near the cities of Guanajay, Remedios, San Cristobal and Sagua la Grande. There were some eight or 10 bases with about four launchers at each base.

Ilyushin-28 light bombers also were marshaling on the island.

In his report to the Nation of October 22, Mr. Kennedy called this "the Soviet military buildup" on Cuba.

Two Rocket Types

He described two distinct types of installation, one for a medium-rocket with a range of more than 1,000 nautical miles, the second, "not yet completed," for intermediate missiles with double this range—and both capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

He also mentioned the bombers.

Mr. Kennedy spoke of "this urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons." Announcing the "quarantine" on further shipments of offensive weapons to Cuba, he warned:

"And these actions may be only the beginning."

The week that preceded this decision is pretty much of a blur to men who participated in it. One describes it as a "nightmare." They cannot now remember clearly where they were or what they did on a given day.

Icy Under Pressure

They can provide only a sketchy picture of Mr. Kennedy during this high-energy, high-tension week—icy. It is his typical reaction when he is under pressure.

As additional evidence of the threat from Cuba rapidly mounted, they were briefed at least once a day, sometimes twice. Between briefings, they gathered in the State Department, examining the terrible potentialities, matching ideas on actions to recommend to the President.

The meetings often went on until late at night.

Two Major Surprises

Two things, they say, surprised them most about the Russian work on the bases and the fact that Soviet Pres-

mier Khrushchev "would do anything so dangerous."

"only four or five days" elapsed between the detection of the first scars in the earth and the rise of the medium-range missile sites.

None, he said, was yet operational. They calculated the 2,000-mile-range missile, distinguished by different markings from the mediums, would become operational by December 1.

As for Mr. Khrushchev's motive in attempting to supplement the armed might of the Soviet Union with a base in the Western Hemisphere, they are only theories.

If Not Here, Where?

One is, "If we didn't do anything about Cuba, we wouldn't do anything about Berlin or any other point."

Or, as another put it, "I you're not going to react when he (Mr. Khrushchev) has something like this pointed right at your guts, when are you going to react?"

The question may remain long unanswered.

But on the morning of Tuesday, October 16, when Mr. Kennedy first was advised of this new evidence, the Russian threat existed and was rapidly increasing in magnitude.

The question was: what to do about it?

Tomorrow: "Samston" and the day of Berlin.

U. S. Satellite's Beacon to 'Wink' Saturday Night

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. (AP)—The blinking beacons on the United States new "firefly" satellite will be triggered for the first time Saturday night, officials report.

The lighting of the four high-intensity arc gas light will signal the beginning of a program which will test the satellite's ability to receive and transmit radio signals and to determine its own position in space.

The satellite, named "Aurora," was rocketed into orbit yesterday from Cape Canaveral. Project engineers reported a system of "firefly" satellites will be launched in the next few weeks and that the first of a series of the satellite's tests will be made tonight.

From that time on, the satellite will be used to test the ability of the satellite to receive and transmit radio signals and to determine its own position in space.

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